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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PUBLIC USE, PUBLIC POLICY AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
THE PROBLEM:
Man, by virtue of the passage of time, has come to a point in history where,
having donned a cloak of modernism, he is compelled to glance backwards and
devote attention to needs by-passed in his rush up the ladder of progress. We
stand atop a pinnacle of progress, victors in the crusade for intellectual, economic
and political acquisition; but the movement has not been without serious re-
percussion. Our position has taken on innumerable aspects of complexity to
such a degree that the government entity has seen fit to interpose its sovereign
prerogative into areas never before contemplated to be within the orbit of
political action. This particular course of conduct has been dictated by the neces-
sity of the times; that is, the necessity for large-scaled governmental action to
cope with problems of huge proportions whose roots are essentially attributable
to the intricacies of present day life. Given the justification and need, still no
successful government sponsored operation can be effective if deficient in the
requisite adequate tools. Cognizant of this necessity, the state, as the established
form of political rule, has maintained an inherently flexible, well equipped legal
tool chest consisting of doctrines amenable to its purpose. It is the intention of
this effort to examine the maximum efficiency of a particular tool, old in vintage,
basic to sovereign power and steeped in doctrine, commonly called "eminent
domain". Vastness of the subject matter requires confinement and for that
reason this survey shall be concerned not with the positive aspects of condem-
nation but rather with its nature and the employment of its prime limitation.
NATURE OF EMINENT DOMAIN:
As alluded to above, eminent domain' has captured a position of great
prestige among legal scholars and authors who describe its characteristics in
superlative portrayals. In succinct terms, the concept can be said to be signifi-
cant of property at its most ultimate degree and significant of a power under-
lying and superior to all property rights. Furthermore, as the usual statements
relate, society possesses the right as an inherent attribute indicative of the highest
1. The term is classically defined as a right or power of a nation to condemn
private property for public use upon payment to the owner of a due compensation
legally ascertained. For other definitions see 15 C. Y. E. 557, Bouvier L. Dict.,
29 C. J. S. 776 Under the Federal Constitution the power of eminent domain
designates the right to take property for public use in payment, under the
provisions of the Fifth Amendment, of just compensation for the value determined
as of the time and place of taking. Campbell v. Chase National Bank of City of
New York, 5 F. Supp. 156, 171 (1933). In England and Canada the proposition is
synonymous with the term "expropriation" as used in foreign jurisprudence.
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power of government.2 As a result it is well settled that eminent domain exists
independent of constitutional sanctions.3 Legislative sanction may restrict or
condition the right but it is established that legislatures do not confer or promul-
gate the power. However, administration of eminent domain is vested in law
making bodies 4 and these are incapable of contracting away their authority;5
a fortiori, one legislature may not deprive any subsequent legislative body of the
power.8
State authority to take private property undoubtedly can be traced back
to a period in history when formalized governments were firt conceived. Early
Romans exercised the power to good advantage in constructing roads, viaducts,
and similarly related public works.7 Although the concept was recognized and
employed by our early predecessors the term "eminent domain" was not made
applicable to the right until a modern concept of private property evolved in
Europe during a period marked by the decline of feudalism.8 Early in the
Seventeenth Century the political philosopher Grotius9 and other notable scholars
of natural law coined the phrase to designate the power of a sovereign state to
take or to authorize the taking of any property within its jurisdiction for the public
2. A contrary theory, not generally accepted in this country, deems the power
a reservation rather than an inherent attribute. The contention is that original
state grants to individuals embraced an implied condition that the state might
resume dominion over the property whenever the interests of the state made such
necessary. See New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, 270 N. Y. 333, 1 X. E.(2d) 153 (1936). Under either theory the power of eminent domain is chaxacter-ized as dormant until a description of its exercise has been formulated by legis-lation Be Poughkeepsie Bridge Co., 108 N. Y. 483, 15 N. E. 601 (1888).
3. In Re City of Rochester, 224 N. Y. 386, 121 N. E. 102 (1918); Kahlen v.State, 223 N. Y. 383, 119 N. E. 883 (1918); New York Telephone Company v. State,
218 N. Y. 783, 113 N. E. 1061 (1916).
4. Re Poughkeepsie Bridge Co. v. Davis, Supra; Re Union Elevated R.R. Co.,
113 N. Y. 275, 21 N. E. 81 (1889).
5. "The power of eminent domain is inalienable; and being an essential
attribute of sovereignty cannot be even partially bargained away." Nichols onEminent Domain (Vol. 1) 75; Also, see People v. Adirondack R. Y. Co., 160 N. Y.225, 54 N. E. 689 (1899).
6. Backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19, 35 Am. Dec. 466 (1840); Lookhaven Bridge
Co. v. Clinton County, 157 Pa. St. 379, 27 Atl. 726 (1893).
7. 18 Am. Jur. 631; 10 R. C. L. 7; But see Nichols on Eminent Domain(Vol. 1) 4, 5.
8. The doctrine first took shape in Holland; it was not recognized In France
until the French Revolution. Nichols, on Eminent Doniain (Vol. 1) 5.
9. The same Grotius who is noted for his explanation of and sanction forinternational law. Other notables in the field of the "higher law" are Plato,
Cicero, Aristotle and Coke.
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use.10 In the United States the power of eminent domain was a relatively un-
important legal topic until the advent of the Industrial Revolution." Before that
period exercise of the doctrine was confined almost entirely to cases involving
roads and grist mills. Application of the condemnati'dn power in these areas
aroused little unfavorable reaction due to the fact that land taken for such use
was generally unsuitable agriculturally and consequently of relatively slight value.' 2
But this was a situation not long in existence. Contemporaneously with the rise
of industrialism and the solidification of the land supply the ancient concept be-
came a recognized branch of legal concern and since that time has gained im-
port with much of the rapidity experienced by the business phenomenon respon-
sible for its growth.'2
LIMITATION OF PUBLIC USE:
For the most part the bounds of eminent domain in respect to its substan-
tive limitations have become well fixed. Private property may not be expro-
priated unless for a public use with due compensation. 14 To the careful analyst
this statement of governmental power is "loaded" with possibilities of limita-
tion.' 5 However, the words "public use" constitute by far the most impressive
and far-reaching limitation to the sovereign right of condemnation. It is in the
area of this limitation that the key to effective, intelligent use of the doctrine lies.
The Public Use Concept is plagued with knotty considerations and nice legal
distinctions. Unfortunately, decisions fail hopelessly in conveying the exact import
10. Grotius, De Jure Belli Et Pacis, lib 111, C. 20. See for an account of the
degree to which the natural law philosophy influenced the evolution of eminent
domain Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 Col. L. R.
596; Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6
Wise. L. R. 67; for constitutional influences in general see 42 Harv. L. R. 149, 152;
Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts (Harvard Studies in Jurisprudence
IV, 1930). John Adams crystallized the natural law theory when he wrote, "There
are rights antecedent to all earthly government-rights hat cannot be repealed
or restrained-rights that are derived from the Great Legislator of the Uni-
verse .. .," Works of Adams (Charles Francis Adam's Ed.) 440. Also see Beck, The
Constitution of the United States.
11. The Federal Government first asserted the right in 1875; see Kohl v.
United States, 91 U. S. 367 (1875). Prior to this assertion federal condemnation
was accomplished indirectly by the states, i.e., a state would undertake the con-
demnation and then turn over to the United States the property which it acquired.
12. 10 R.C.L. 6.
13. See 51 Col. L. R. 595.
14. Such provision is found in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States and also, in substance, in the Constitution of nearly every state.
15. Namely, (1) to what powers does it apply, (2) what is a "public use,"(3) what is a "taking," (4) what is "property," (5) what is "just compensation."
18 Am. Jur. 632.
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of public use; they lead only into a most hopeless confusion.16 Nevertheless,
two principle lines of demarcation may be extracted from the case authority. The
dichotomy in outlook is in part due to the fact that "use" in legal terms is capable
of two entirely different meanings.1T One line of decisions holds that "use" is
synonymous with advantage while another claims a connotation which essentially
involves considerations of employment. Those jurisdictions which advocate a
public employment criterion insist that a public use must impose upon the holder
of the appropriated property a duty to furnish the public with the use intended and
that the public should be entitled to this use as a matter of right.I8 The contra-
vailing doctrine is that public use implies public advantage. Under such a theory
any expropriation tending towards increased utilization of resources and produc-
tive power or manifesting a service to social prosperity is a public use.19 Each
of these theories has been subject to a hailstorm of criticism. The view support-
ing a use by the public criterion has been declared both too narrow 20 and, con.
versely, too broad21_its counterpart, the Public Benefit Doctrine, has faired
16. "No question has ever been submitted to the courts upon which there Is agreater variety and conflict of reasoning and results than that presented as to the
meaning of the words, "public use," as found in different state constitutions
regulating the right of eminent domain. The reasoning is, in many of the cases,
as unsatisfactory as the results have been uncertain . . . The authorities are sodiverse and conflicting that, no matter which road a court may take, it will be
sustained and opposed by about an equal number of the decided cases. In thisdilemma the meaning must, in every case, be determined by the common sense of
each individual judge who has the power of deciding it." Dayton Gold and S.Min. Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394 (1846). "The reason courts have failed to define
a public use doubtlessly arises from the fact that the definition must be such as
to give it a degree of elasticity capable of meeting new conditions and improve-
ments and the ever-increasing needs of society." Tanner v. Treasury Tunnel
Min. and Reduction Co. 35 Colo. 593, 83 Pac. 464 (1906). See for similar authority
22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 35, 10 R. C. L. 24.
17. 'Use" is also ambivalent when its definition is attempted in a non legal
manner. See Webster's New International Dictionary. (Second Ed.).
18. This has been described as the majority view. In Be New York, 135N. Y. 253, 31 N. E. 1043 (1892); Healy Lumber Co. v. Morris, 33 Wash. 490, 74Pac. 681 (1904); Scholl v. German Coal Co., 118 Ill. 427, 10 N. E. 199 (1887);Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland; 126 Ky. 656, 104 S. W. 762 (1907); MinnesotaCanal, Etc. Co. v. Koochiching Co., 97 Minn. 429, 107 N. W. 405 (1906). Also see10 R. C. L. 24, 2 L. R. A. 681, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 39, 18 Am. Jur. 36. For a descrip-
tion of the evolution of this so-called "narrow doctrine" see Nichols, Public UseIn Eminent Domain, 20 Bul. Rev. 615. The doctrine at present Is substantially
repudiated. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller, supra.
19. Board of Water Commissioners v. Manchester, 87 Conn. 193, 87 AUt. 870(1913); Potlach Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 Pac. 426 (1907); Jacobs
v. Clearview Water Supply, CoL., 220 Pa. St. 388, 69 Ati. 870 (1908); Nash v. Clark,27 Utah 158, 75 Pac. 371 (1904).
20. Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (1905); Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532(1866); Potlach Lumber Co. v. Peterson, supra; Aldridge v. Tusecumbia, C. & D. 1?.Co., 2 Stew. & P. 199, 25 Am. Dec. 307 (1833).
21. "If public use is use by the public, eminent domain might be employed to
secure sites for hotels and theaters, to which places in many states the public hasby custom or statute the right of access without discrimination." 18 Am. Jur. 666.
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somewhat better in that the accusations urged against it have been concerned only
with its broadness.2 2 It is submitted that the basic difficulty has arisen by virtue
of the judiciary's attempt to reconcile two conflicting interests. Namely, the de-
sire to maintain a dynamic quality about the Public Use Concept so as to pre-
serve its role as a soundboard for public sentiment concerning the invasion of
private property rights and, coexistent with that, to establish as definitive a test
as possible for the legality of a given condemnation proceeding. The Use by the
Public Concept is essentially grounded in considerations of certainty; the Public
Benefit Rule in considerations of fluidity.2 3 Each criterion viewed as a bald state-
ment represents an extreme viewpoint; ergo, in an attempt to find a desirable
balance for the above mentioned considerations each has extended itself in the
dirction of the other. Thus it has been that the Public Benefit Doctrine, although
capable of almost unlimited application has been severely tempered.2 4 The courts
have refused to give the doctrine any resemblance to a universal standard25 on the
ground that its employment basically compels speculation as to resulting benefits;
and therefore results in instability of principle.26 When applicable, the test has
usually been qualified to the extent that the judiciary has demanded a certain
directness of benefit and great necessity for benefit. The Use by the Public Test
which on its face lacks in extensive linguistic vagueness so as to justify broad in-
terpretations has proved to be less amenable to judicial surgery than its counterpart.
However this difficulty has neither dismayed nor discouraged the courts. In
troublesome situations where the test if applied would produce inadequate results
in terms of public policy, the courts have stricken out 2 or isolated 28 or amelior-
22. Rockingharm County Light & P. Co. v. Hebbs, 72 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46
(1904); Arnsberger v. Crawford, 101 Mid. 247, 61 AUt. 413 (1905); Shasta Power Co.
v. Walker, 149 Fed. 568 (1906); Board of Health v. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533,
49 N. W. 894 (1891).
23. "The struggle to meet changing conditions through new legislation con-
tinually goes on. The final question is whether society is prepared for the change.
The law of each age is ultimately what that age thinks should be the law."
People Ex. Rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. Edward B. La Fetra, 230 N. Y. 429, 130
N. E. 601 (1921).
24. Fcuntain Park Co. v. Hansler, 199 Ind. 95, 155 N. E. 465 (1927); Healy
Lumber Co. v. Morris, supra; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & H. River R. Co., 18 Wend.
(N. Y.) 9, 31 Am. Dec. 313 (1837).
25. "... the doctrine that public benefit and utility justify the exercise of the
right of eminent domain has been asserted more especially in four classes of cases:
those relating to the development of water power for mills, under general mill or
flowage acts; those arising under drainage act for the reclamation of wet and
marshy lands; those relating to the irrigation of arid lands; and those relating to
the promotion of mining." Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 61 AUt. 785 (1905).
26. Supra N. 24.
27. See New York City Housing Authority v. Muller (condemnation for reha-
bilitation of slum areas) supra.
28. See 18 Am. Jur. 666,
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ated 23 its applicability and have plugged the gap with assertions in terms of the
more pliable Public Benefit Standard or in terms of sovereign police power.
The entire problem which resolves itself about the Test of Public Use-
wrought as it is with a mass of conflicting authority-may well be circumvented
in the light of recent developments. It has been illustrated that the confusion and
irreconcilable viewpoints resultant from the attempt to apply extreme criteria of
a universal nature to dynamic factual situations could readily be precluded in a
simple but drastic mode; i. e., by taking the determination of public use out ofjudicial hands and placing it squarely under legislative auspices. The net effect
of such a transmission would be the destruction of any justiciable issue as to the
existence of a public use. Under the terms of this arrangement legislative declara,
tion concerning a certain condemnation proceedings public purpose would con-
stitute an irrebutable presumption in law that the requisite public use or purpose
is fulfilled.
The most recent tendencies in this area have been indicated in New York
State. General Municipal Law P. 72-J provides that a condemnation of land for
a public parking garage to bd built by the city but leased to a private operator is
for a public purpose. New York City entered into a contract with an insurance
company whereby the city agreed to condemn certain lands under General Muni.
cipal Law P. 72-J and to offer the same at public aution. The insurance company
agreed to bid for the lease and to construct a public parking garage. In a tax-
payer's action to restrain the city from performance under the contract on grounds
that the contract was illegal because the use contemplated was not public but
private, the Supreme Court, Special Term, New York County, rendered judgment
for defendants.30 On appeal the Appellate Division reversed 31 and the New York
Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the Appellate Division.32 In a 4-3 decision
the court indicated that public use is still a matter of judicial concern. However,
the marginal manner in which this point was decided indicates some degree of
29. "For a use to be public It Is not essential that the entire community, or
any considerable portion of It, should directly enjoy or participate in It." Albright
v. Sussex County Lake and Park Commission, 71 N. J. L. 303, 57 Atl. 398 (1904).
"It is not even necessary that all the inhabitants of the limited area to which the
operations of an enterprise Is confined should be equally benefited by It, In orderto make it a public use." Lake Koen Nay. Reservoir & Irrig. Co. v. MeI n, 63 Kan.484, 65 Pac. 684 (1901). A collection of a case authority In this point Is collected
at 22 L. R. A. (N. S.) 48.
30. Denihan Enterprises, Inc. v. William O'Dwyer, as Mayor of the City ol
New York, Et. Al. 197 MIsc. 950, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 326 (1950).
31. 277 App. Div. 407, 100 N. Y. S. 2d 512 (1950).
32. 302 N. Y. 451, 99 N. E. 2d 235 (1951).
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support towards vesting the legislature with extremely broad powers of determin-
ation about the employment of eminent domain.S Desmond, J., speaking for
the minority stated:
"We all agree that the Legislature has settled the question of
whether condemnation of land for a public parking garage, to be built
by the city but leased to a private operator is for a public purpose. The
public nature of such a use would not be destroyed by a demonstration,
on a trial of this action, that this proposed garage will largely benefit,
and is principally desired by, the owner of the apartment house across
the street for its tenants, or that the project may accomplish only a
little alleviation of traffic conditions, or that, in the end, the apartment
house tenants across the street, rather than the general public will have
principal use of the garage. All those are, on their face, arguments not
against the legality, but as to the feasability, or wisdom, or fairness, of
the expenditure. Such arguments, when rejected by the appropriate
legislative body, cannot be re-examined by the courts."3-
THE PRACTICABILITY OF PRECLUDING JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
IMPETUS FOR SUCH A PRECLUSION:
Under the traditional well settled view, the legislature has the first but not
the final important duty of determining the existence of a public use.3 5 The
legislature in its capacity as a body entrusted with the sovereign power of eminent
domain has the obligation not to exercise the .power unless its motivating purpose
is public in nature. Only where the legislature fails in its obligation do the courts
exert their ultimate duty to insure obedience to the Constitutional limitation.
The problem for the judiciary at this point is not to assume a legislative role and
to judge iupon a certain uses public nature but rather to decide whether the leg-
islature which authorized the condemnation might reasonably have considered a
public use to be in existence. As is the case with any legislative act the usual pre-
sumption of constitutionality is present and must be overcome before the act may
be upset However, the constitutional presumption surrounding legislation which
declares a certain condemnation activity's public use is somewhat unique due to
33. The courts have reserved judicial review on the grounds that if they
didn't the constitutional restraint would be utterly nugatory and the legislature
would make any use public by simply declaring it so, and hence its will and
discretion become supreme, however arbitrarily and tyranically exercised, New
York Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal Co., 37 Md. 537 (1841), or on the
grounds that should the legislature transcend its constitutional authority its acts
would be void and it is the duty of the court to declare such acts as void. Scudder
v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co. 1 N. J. Esq. 694, 23 Am. Dec. 756 (1832); Concord
R. Co. v. Greely, 17 N. H. 47 (1845).
34. Italics supplied.
35. 18 Am. Jur. 675, 29 C. J. S. 820, People Ex. Rel. Horton v. Pendergast, 220
App. Div. 351, 222 N. Y. Supp. 29 (1927); Board of Black River Regulating Dist. v.
Ogsbury, 203 App. Div. 43, 196 N. Y. Supp. 281 (1923),
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its vast potency. So potent is the presumption and the court's unwillingness to
upset it that the very existence of a judicial right to ultimate determination has
com& to be questioned. The first noteworthy comment a6 upon the situation was
uttered in the federal courts when Justice Black, in considering a case involving
the employment of eminent domain by the federal government declared:37
"We think that it is the function of Congress to decide what type
of taking is for a public use and that the Agency authorized to do the
taking may do so to the full extent of its statutory authority."
With this statement the judiciary's position as the guardian of public use was
put in jeopardy and grave doubts were created as to the state of the law regarding
review of federal condemnation proceedings38 Although these doubts were sub.
sequently quelled .by Supreme Court inferences that no actual change in the law
had been effected,39 the stigma of Black's comment served to highlight the court's
loatheness to upset legislative decision upon the propriety and legality of govern-
ment sponsored expropriations of private properties. The Supreme Court's re-
affirmation of ultimate judicial review must be recognized to be without import if
the protective walls constructed about the legislative determination in actuality
relegate the power into an almost purely theoretical position. A minority of thejudges on the New York Court of Appeals evidently are among those who feel
that the tremendous burden placed upon a plaintiff who seeks to upset the legis.
36. There have been earlier comments. Lewis, Eminent Domain. (3rd Ed.)498, 499. See Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311 (1859) in which the court refers toSedgwick on Stat. & Con. Law at pages 512, 513: "As the power to take Is uni-
versal so it is absolute; that is to say, the legislature are the sole judges of the
existence of the exigency which demands the sacrifice of the rights of individuals.
'I admit,' says Mr. Chancellor Woolworth, 'that the legislature are the sole judges
as to the expediency of exercising the right of eminent domain for the purpose ofmaking public improvements, either for the benefit of the inhabitants of the Stategenerally, or of any particular section thereof.' 'It is the undoubted and exclusiveprovince of the legislature,' says the supreme court of the State of Maine, 'todecide when the public exigencies require that private property be taken for
public uses."
37. United States Ex. Bel. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 U. S.546 (1946). Justices Reed and Frankfurter, separately concurring, insisted thatthe problem was still ultimately subject to judicial review.
38. " ... it should be noted that even the judicial power to inquire Into thepublic use question has been placed in doubt by recent decisions." United States
v. 40.75 Acres of Land, Etc. 76 F. Supp. 239 (1948).
39. In a later Supreme Court decision (U. S. v. Carmack, 329 U. S. 230)(1946) the court at least strongly implied that the Welch case effected no changein the law-that it did not remove from all judicial review the public use for
which property may be taken. Also, see Hand, J. dissenting In U. 8. v. State ofN. Y., 160 F. 2d 479 (1947).
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lative determination is so impossible to overcome that it should openly be declared
insurmountable.40
The over-all feasibility of the above described position demands a concen-
trated treatment beyond the scope of the survey. Nevertheless, in reiteration it
might well be noted that a strict legislative determination of public use would sub-
stantially serve to clear the judicially inspired haze which clings to the Public
Use Criterion. The so-called extrinsive conflict between fluidity and definitive-
ness which is basic in the consideration of a definition of public use would be
resolved if judicial expression were precluded. Legislative declarations, in that
they are not hampered by the stare decisis doctrine, are of utmost sensitivity to
public opinion. If endowed with a binding effect they would also provide a legal
stability at any given time about the validity of a given public appropriation.
These attributes although not predicated on grounds incidental to the main line
of reasoning, are not to be dismissed lightly.
CONCLUSION:
Eminent domain is of utmost importance in that it is an avenue facilitating the
growing influence of the sovereign power upon private rights. The prime limita-
tion to the exercise of condemnation proceedings is the Constitutional require-
ment of public use. The public use criterion by its very nature and by the exten-
sive considerations its definition demands has caused a great deal of judicial con-
fusion. Issues concerning the standard of public use could be clarified in a drastic
way. Namely, by precluding the judicial authority to dictate the ingredients of
public use and reformulating the doctrine so as to be strictly within the legislative
framework. Progress in this direction is evidently afoot but probably due to another
impetus-the view being that ultimate judicial review is in actuality a negligible
right of such inconsequential character that its consideration should be abandoned.
Both considerations constitute valid factors towards the -establishment of public
use as a purely legislative question. It remains to be seen whether their weight
is sufficient to overthrow the majority viewpoint.
Morree Levine
40. More recent expressions upon the burden have been voiced in U. S. Ex
Rel and For Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Russell, 87 F. Supp. 386 (1948);
U. S. Ex Rel and For Use of Tennesee Valley Authority v. Easterly, 87 F. Supp.
390 (1948). The present generally accepted state of the law is that when the
legislature has declared the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment will
be respected by the courts unless the use is palpably without reasonable founda-
tion. See U. S. v. Gettysburg Electric Railway, 160 U. S. 668 (1896); and also-
Dillen on Municipal Corporations (4th Ed.) Para. 600.
